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Gärdenfors' and Levi's theories of rational belief changes will be compared to Kuhn's theory of scientific
progress. Gärdenfors' proposal to analyze scientific revolutions in terms of big changes in epistemic en-
trenchment will be criticized for not being able to represent the important constituting function of the
paradigms. Parts of Levi's theory that are incompatible with Kuhn's theory will be shown to be either too
restrictive or too broad for a model of scientific progress. The paper will end with a comparison of Levi's
conceptual frameworks to Kuhn's theory of scientific change. Some characteristics of scientific revolu-
tions will also be discussed.
1. Introduction
This essay is focused on what Gärdenfors (1988, p 7) calls epistemic theories, theories about ratio-
nal belief changes. An epistemic theory uses set theory, logic and other formal systems as tools. Dif-
ferent  models  have been proposed as suitable  models  for  rational  changes  of belief.  Two well
known theories are the AGM-model and Levi's model. Both these will be discussed in this text.
If science is a rational enterprise it should be possible to create an epistemic theory giving the
formal description of the rational parts of science. The goal of this essay is to give some ideas that
can work as a ground for such a theory.
Many different theories about science have been discussed by philosophers. The one that will be
used here is Kuhn's theory of scientific change. The choice of Kuhn's theory is not unproblematic.
While Gärdenfors seems to have a Kuhnian conception of science, Levi is critical to Kuhn. His dis-
cussion about belief changes is also a discussion in the philosophy of science where theories incom-
patible with Kuhn's are presented. Arguments against some of Levi's theories about science will be
given.
The aim of this text is to give some requirements on a theory about belief changes that wants to
work as a model for scientific inquiry. Criteria for an epistemic theory that can describe changes be-
tween Kuhnian paradigms will be given. These criteria are found by discussing how the AGM-mod-
el and Levi's model accounts for big scientific changes, and by showing where and why these two
models fail.
2. Explaining paradigm
Science is often seen as a partly accumulative process where new knowledge is added to the old.
According to Kuhn, this view is flawed. Instead periods where science is mainly accumulative are
interrupted by scientific revolutions. These revolutions question the fundamental parts or the science
and ends with a redefinition of the methods available, the problems that are considered central for
the scientific field and even the scientists’ conception of the world.
The accumulative periods in science are called  normal science. Normal science is possible be-
cause the scientists share some common beliefs, called paradigms. Science without a paradigm ex-
ists before any paradigm is accepted and when a scientific revolution takes place as an answer to
some unsolved problem for some paradigm.
Before a paradigm is accepted, there is no rule that separates interesting facts from the uninterest-
ing. The fact-gathering is more or less random, and usually restricted to data that already lies ready
to hand (Kuhn, 1970, pp 15-16). A theory is created to point out which parts of the big amount of
data that is of special interest and particularly revealing. When a theory becomes accepted by the
scientific community, it becomes a paradigm.
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Normal science is (at least to a great extent) an accumulative enterprise, where new knowledge is
added to old. The paradigm puts focus on a small part of the available data, making it possible for
the scientists to study the field defined by the paradigm in more detail than it would be possible to
do without the paradigm (Kuhn 1970, p 24).
In the postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (1970, pp 181-191) gives an ex-
planation of what constitutes the paradigm. There might be other parts of the paradigm as well, but
Kuhn believes that these are the most important parts. The different components are symbolic gen-
eralizations,  examples,  values and beliefs in  particular  models (metaphysical  and other sorts  of
models that supply the community with suitable analogies and metaphors). A symbolic generaliza-
tion is for example  f=ma, which defines what force, mass and acceleration is. The role symbolic
generalization has is not that of a formal definition but rather it helps to explain all the terms used.
In a later text, Kuhn (1990) introduces taxonomic lexicons. Taxonomic lexicons are to a big ex-
tent the same as symbolic generalizations and supply the scientist with definitions of important
terms and their relation. Without a taxonomic lexicon no description of the world would be possi-
ble. Terms in the taxonomic lexicon have two important properties. They are kind-terms taking the
indefinite article (a, an or some in English), and they conforms to what Kuhn (1990, p 4) calls the
no-overlap principle. No two terms in the taxonomic lexicon may overlap in their referents unless
they are related as species to genus.
According to Kuhn (1990, p 5), a taxonomic lexicon might also be called a conceptual scheme,
where a conceptual scheme is a particular operating mode of a mental module prerequisite to having
beliefs. This mode both supplies and put up bounds on which sets of beliefs it is possible to con-
ceive. Even though the taxonomic lexicon has been introduced as a linguistic structure, Kuhn sees it
at least partly as a pre-linguistic module that even animals may have.
According to Kuhn (1970, pp 198-200) different paradigms differ in language, which creates
communication-problems between supporters of different paradigms. But the problem can not be
solved by creating paradigm-independent definitions of the important terms because Kuhn (2000, p
38) claims that  there exist  no language into  which both  theories  can be translated  without  any
residue or loss. Kuhn calls this incommensurability.
That it is impossible to translate does not mean that it is impossible for a person to understand
two different paradigms. Kuhn (2000, pp 37-40) makes a distinction between translation and inter-
pretation. A translation is a replacement of a word with a more or less equivalent statement word or
statement in a different language. For example, a translation of 'Gavagai' might be 'rabbit' or some
longer sentence in English, referring exactly to the objects 'Gavagai' refers to. In some cases howev-
er, no equivalent term or sentence can be found. Kuhn's (2000, pp 40-41) example is about phlogis-
ton. The phlogiston-theory explained among other things how fire was possible. According to the
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theory, something that could burn contained the substance phlogiston. Burning was supposed to be a
process where phlogiston moved from the burning object to the surrounding air. The term phlogis-
ton can not, according to Kuhn, be translated into the language used by modern chemists. Phlogis-
ton was used where many different terms are used today. In some cases, like 'phlogisticated air'
phlogiston refers to oxygen, in other cases no modern term with the same referent exists at all. A
translation of phlogiston would have to give criteria for all the different possible uses of the word.
Some terms like 'element' exist in two different paradigms, but their meaning differ between the
paradigms. As some terms have new meanings and some have disappeared from the vocabulary no
coherent translation can be done according to Kuhn. That's the way different paradigms are incom-
mensurable.
While working inside a taxonomic lexicon, certain statements can be judged as true or false. But
not all statements are candidates for truth or falsity. Kuhn explains how to assert truth and falsity in
the following way:
First determine the status of the statement: is it a candidate for true/false? To that question, as you'll short-
ly see, the answer is lexicon-dependent. And second, supposing a positive answer to the first, is the state-
ment rationally assertable? To that question, given a lexicon, the answer is properly found by something
like the normal rules of evidence. (Kuhn 1990, p 9)
So which statements that are candidates for truth or falsity depends on the taxonomic lexicon. If a
statement is a candidate either the statement A or its negation -A is true.
The question of truth and falsity is not a question of correspondence with an “external, mind-in-
dependent world” (Kuhn, 1990, p 6). Rather, it is a question of which of the statements that are bet-
ter for doing what the scientists are doing. The judgment of truth and falsity is thus dependent on
what the scientific enterprise is. According to Kuhn (1990, p 6) the goal of science is much like puz-
zle-solving. However, the structure of science as explained here exists independent of the goal of
science, so most of the reasoning here is independent of what the goal really is.
As  a  lexicon  is  a  prerequisite  for  judgment  of  truth  or  falsity,  lexicons  themselves  and  the
paradigms they are part of can not be judged as true or false. But that does not mean that no criteria
exist for choices between paradigms. Kuhn (1977, pp 321-322) lists five important criteria for the
choice between paradigms. These includes accuracy, consistency with itself and with other currently
accepted theories applicable to related aspects of nature, broad scope making it possible to applicate
the theory to parts far beyond the observations and laws it was initially designed to explain, and
simplicity. The theory should also be fruitful when it comes to new scientific findings.
The paradigm is not only the taxonomic lexicon, but according to Irzik and Grünberg (1995, pp
300-301) the taxonomic lexicon and the other parts of the paradigm are intertwined in such a way
that a change in one part involves a change in the other. Therefore, a paradigm shift always includes
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a change in the taxonomic lexicon, and the characteristics for changes in taxonomic lexicon also ap-
ply to paradigm shifts.
It should be noted that even though paradigms are shared among the scientific community and
have an important role as shared beliefs and shared linguistic terms, a paradigm also has an impor-
tant role for an individual inquirer inside the scientific community. Conceptual schemes discussed
earlier are an important example of that. In this paper, it is mostly the role of a paradigm for an indi-
vidual inquirer that will be discussed.
3. The AGM-model
Gärdenfors (1988, pp 7-8) distinguish three factors that form the core of epistemic theories. The
first factor is epistemic states or states of belief. An epistemic state is a representation of a person's
beliefs at a certain point of time. Epistemic states are rational idealizations of psychological states.
A second factor is a classification of the different status the elements of the epistemic states can
have. Gärdenfors calls these different status epistemic attitudes.
The third factor is epistemic inputs. These can be experience, linguistic input and other things
that can change a person’s epistemic state.
In the AGM-model, developed by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson, epistemic states are
represented by belief sets. A belief set consists of exactly those sentences that a person accepts as
true. As this model is a linguistic model it demands a language L. Gärdenfors (1988, p 21) leaves
most details about L open, but assumes that it contains the standard sentential connectives. In this
essay as in Gärdenfors (1988) book, the following symbols will be used:
negation: -
conjunction: &
disjunction: ∨
material implication: →
L also contains the constants truth  and ⊤ falsity ⊥. These constants are used as ideal points, and
do not say anything about the external world.
In Gärdenfors' (1988, p 22) model, an inquirer has one of the following epistemic attitude to each
sentence A in L:
A is accepted
A is rejected
A is indetermined, the inquirer has neither accepted nor rejected A.
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If A is rejected then - A is accepted. Thus, rejection can be defined with the help of acceptance.
For an epistemic state to be rational, some further restrictions must be added. Only sets of sen-
tences satisfying the following two rationality criteria are belief sets:
The set of accepted sentences should be consistent
Logical consequences of what is accepted should also be accepted (Gärdenfors, 1988, p 22)
Both theses can be motivated pragmatically. Inconsistent sets are of little help as guidance for our
actions, and if we can not draw the logical consequences of available information, we will not be
able to use the information effectively.
Gärdenfors (1988, pp 24-25) makes some further assumptions about the language L. He assumes
that it is governed by a logic identified with the consequence relation ├. The consequence relation
satisfies the following conditions:
If A is a truth-functional tautology, then ├ A.
Modus Ponens. That is, if ├ A → B and ├ A, then ├ B.
Not ├ . That is, ├ is consistent. (Gärdenfors, 1988, p 24)⊥
The first condition says that a sentence A is logically valid if and only if it is a consequence of the
empty set. The two rationality-criteria given earlier can now be formulated in the following way,
giving a definition of belief sets:
A set K of sentences is a (nonabsurd) belief set iff (i)  is not a logical consequence of the sentences⊥
in K and (ii) if K ├ B, then B  ∈ K.
A set of sentences that includes all the logical consequences of the set is said to be in equilibrium.
As this is part of the definition of belief sets, belief sets are in equilibrium.
As explained before, there are three possible epistemic attitudes to a sentence A in the belief set
K. If A  ∈ K, then A is accepted. If – A  K∈ , then A is rejected. If neither A  ∈ K nor – A  K∈ , then A
is indetermined. Given this three attitudes, six different changes are possible. An accepted sentence
can become rejected or indetermined, a rejected sentence can become accepted or indetermined, and
an indetermined sentence can become accepted or rejected. Gärdenfors (1988, p 47-48) gives three
different types of changes that together cover all the possible cases. The first is expansion, where ei-
ther A or - A becomes accepted in the belief set, and where A previously where indetermined. The
second type of change is contraction, where a previously accepted or rejected sentence becomes in-
determined. The last type of change is revision, where a previously accepted sentence becomes re-
jected. Revision can be defined as a sequence of contractions and expansions (Gärdenfors 1988, pp
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68-69). If – A is to be revised, we can begin by contract – A from the belief set K, and after the con-
traction  expand  with  A.  Thus,  only two  types  of  changes  are  needed  to  cover  all  six  possible
changes.
Expansion is a simple operation in Gärdenfors model (1988, p 47) where the previously indeter-
mined sentence  A is accepted as true, together with all the consequences of  A and the belief set.
Contraction is more problematic. If we contract A from the belief set K, sentences which have A as a
consequence has to be contracted too. Suppose we have the sentences B and C, which together have
A as a consequence. Then either B or C or both B and C have to be contracted as well. But how do
we choose which of the sentences to contract? Gärdenfors (1988, pp 86-87) introduces  epistemic
entrenchment as a way to determine a sentence's fate when the current belief set is contracted.1
Single sentences in the language L have epistemic entrenchment. The epistemic entrenchment of
a sentence in the belief set K can be determined independently of what happens to K at contraction.
When the belief set K is contracted, the sentences with the lowest epistemic entrenchment in K are
the sentences that are given up. The main criterion when determining the epistemic entrenchment of
a sentence is how important the sentence is when planning future actions, conducting experiments
and so on.
Gärdenfors (1988, pp 91-94) distinguish two different origins of epistemic entrenchment. The or-
dering of epistemic entrenchment gets its fundamental structure from these two origins. The finer
ordering of the epistemic entrenchment is however dependent on pragmatic factors. The pragmatic
factors are highly context dependent, and give a complement to the rougher ordering first given by
some of the other origins.
The first of the origins is the information-theoretic approach.  With this approach, epistemic en-
trenchment is supposed to be equivalent to  informational value. Informational value is then given
by some function where a probability-value for the sentence is used as input. In Gärdenfors model
however, the sentences in the belief set are hold to be maximally certain, and thus all of them have
maximal probability. So this approach is not useful for Gärdenfors.
The second approach is called the paradigmatic approach. Many theories about science hold that
some statements in science are never (or seldom) questioned. Kuhn's symbolic generalizations have
this property according to Gärdenfors. This creates a hierarchy among the sentences in a scientific
theory, where the sentences that are part of the paradigm have the highest epistemic entrenchment.
If follows from this that a paradigm-shift involves a big change in the ordering of epistemic en-
trenchment, and that a paradigm-shift can be detected by a big change.
1 There exist contraction functions that do not need the notion of epistemic entrenchment. However, epistemic en-
trenchment can be interesting anyway for example as a measure of a sentences importance in the belief set. Gärden-
fors (1988, p 88) considers the notion of epistemic entrenchment to be more fundamental than the contraction func-
tion. Thus, epistemic entrenchment can be used to evaluate different contraction functions.
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4. Paradigm-shifts as mere changes in entrenchment
How strong is the relation between a paradigm-shift and a big change in the ordering of epistemic
entrenchment? Gärdenfors writes:
On my view of epistemic entrenchment a change of paradigm typically involves a radical change of the or-
dering of epistemic entrenchment, and, vice versa, a substantial change of the degrees of epistemic en-
trenchment of the theses in a scientific field is a strong indication of what Kuhn calls a “scientific revolu-
tion”. (Gärdenfors, 1988, p 88)
It  is  possible  to  make  two  different  interpretations  from this.  One  interpretation  is  that  while
paradigmatic  shifts  are  related to  changes  in  entrenchment  but  there  is  something  more  giving
paradigmatic shifts the important features they have. This interpretation will be called the weak in-
terpretation. Another interpretation is that paradigmatic shifts are big changes in entrenchment and
nothing else. Levi supports this stronger interpretation of Gärdenfors:
The tenor of his [Gärdenfors'] remarks suggests that he thinks that profound changes in orderings with re-
spect to entrenchment attributable to deep-running changes in corpus or belief state are the stuff of which
paradigm switches are made (Levi, 1991, p 145)
Does Gärdenfors support the weak or the strong interpretation? His (1988, p 92) reasoning about
paradigms as a way to determine the epistemic entrenchment of sentences suggests that the impor-
tant feature of Kuhn's theory about paradigms is to give criterion for the evaluation of epistemic en-
trenchment. This gives support for the stronger interpretation. However, Gärdenfors (1988, p 94)
also gives support for the weaker interpretation when he writes that paradigm-shifts can be detected
by big changes in the epistemic ordering. If paradigm-shifts were the same as big changes in epis-
temic entrenchment they would not be detected by such changes, they would be such changes.
Independent of what Gärdenfors really thinks about paradigm-shifts, he does not discuss them in
relation to any other notion than epistemic entrenchment. No better structure to represent paradigm-
shifts is given. Until some other structure is introduced to solve the problem, we can assume that en-
trenchment is the only available notion with which we can analyze paradigm-shifts in the AGM-
model.
One interesting critique against explaining paradigm shifts as changes in epistemic entrenchment
is given by Friedman (2000). His discussion is a comparison between Quine's holistic theory pre-
sented in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', and Kuhn's theory. According to Quine, the only important
difference between statements is their entrenchment:
Certain statements, though about physical objects and not sense experience, seem peculiarly germane to
sense experience - and in a selective way: some statements to some experiences, others to others. Such
statements, especially germane to particular experiences, I picture as near the periphery. But in this rela-
tion of 'germaneness' I envisage nothing more than a loose association reflecting the relative likelihood, in
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practice, of our choosing one statement rather than another for revision in the event of recalcitrant experi-
ence. (Quine, 2001, p 50)
As epistemic entrenchment is the relative likelihood for one statement rather than another to be re-
vised, Quine's view is the same as the stronger interpretation of Gärdenfors' view.
Quine's holistic theory is developed against Carnap's theory about analytic and synthetic state-
ments. According to Friedman, Kuhn's and Carnap's theories are closely related:
Kuhn's central distinction between change of paradigm or revolutionary science, on the one side, and nor-
mal science, on the other, closely parallels the Carnapian distinction between change of language or lin-
guistic framework and rule-governed operations carried out within such a framework. (Friedman, 2000, p
377)
Friedman considers Quine's theory incompatible with both Carnap's and Kuhn's theory. He (2000, p
374) uses an example from the history of science to make his point clear. In the shift to Newtonian
physics, Friedman identifies three revolutionary steps. The introduction of a revolutionary mathe-
matical idea with Newton's calculus, a new conception of force and quantity of matter with New-
ton's three laws of motion, and a new universal law of nature with Newton's universal law of gravi-
tation. All these changes were inspired by the same empirical problem, to give a single mathemati-
cal theory of motion that gives an account for both celestial and terrestrial phenomenas. This might
seem to give support for Quine's holistic theory. The three parts were introduced together to solve
the same problem, and so all parts of the theory, the mathematical as well as the mechanical and
gravitational physical, might seem to be treated the same way as they are added to solve the same
problem. However, Friedman (2000, p 374-375) argues that the change is a change not only in epis-
temic entrenchment. Instead some of the changes have a constitutional function without which other
parts of the theory would not make sense.
Consider the second law of motion, f = ma, force equals mass times acceleration. Without calcu-
lus, the second law of motion would not make sense, as we would not be able to calculate the accel-
eration. So the mathematical part of the theory provides part of a language which makes it possible
to state the theory at all. A similar relationship exists between Newton's law of universal gravitation
and his mechanics. The law of universal gravitation states that there is a force of attraction between
two masses. The attraction is proportional to the product of the two masses and inversely propor-
tional to the square of the distance between them. The masses experience acceleration towards each
other according to the rule. But the acceleration must be relative to some frame of reference. New-
ton thought the movement was defined relative to absolute space, but practically the acceleration
takes place relative to an inertial frame, which is defined as a frame where Newton's laws of motion
holds. This means that the law of universal gravitation would not make empirical sense without the
laws of motions.
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According to Friedman (2000, p 377), the conceptual changes that appears during scientific revo-
lutions can not be explained only with entrenchment. In the section where Kuhn's theory about sci-
entific change were introduced, the role of conceptual schemes was described as something that de-
termines what it is possible to conceive. A shift of paradigm is a shift of conceptual scheme. What
is needed is a structure suitable to represent the changes in what it is possible to conceive. As Fried-
man has shown, entrenchment is not the right notion for this.
5. Levi's model
Because of the AGM-models shortcomings with representing paradigm-shifts, Levi's epistemic the-
ory will be discussed.
In the AGM-model sets of sentences were used to represent an inquirer's belief. Standard set the-
oretic operations could then be used with the set (for example, the epistemic attitude acceptance can
be defined the following way: A is accepted in K iff A  K∈ ). Levi (1991, pp 7-10) has chosen a dif-
ferent approach. The central notion for his system is state of full belief. A person’s state of full be-
lief is the sum of what the person believes at a specific time and the deductive consequences of her
beliefs.
When a person changes her beliefs, a different state of full belief is created. All the states of full
belief a person can be in is ordered in a conceptual framework. The states in a conceptual frame-
work are potential states of full belief. Note that a change from one potential state of full belief to
another does not entail a change of conceptual framework.
The potential states of full belief in a conceptual framework are ordered after strength. A poten-
tial state of full belief K* is stronger than another potential state of full belief K if and only if a per-
son in state K* believes the same thing as a person in state K plus something more. The ordering is
from stronger to weaker potential states of full beliefs. A weaker state is a consequence of a stronger
state.
There are two goals with inquiry in Levi's model. The first goal Levi (1991, p 10-11) discusses is
acquisition of new information that are valuable for us – We strive to maximize informational val-
ue.
The other important goal of inquiry according to Levi (1991, p 11) is avoidance of error. The in-
quirer will try to avoid changing to a state of full belief that is erroneous.
The potential states of full belief that are part of the conceptual framework can be judged in three
different ways, corresponding to the AGM-models three different epistemic attitudes. Some states
are judged as free of error, some states are judge erroneous, and, at least in most cases, the inquirer
is in suspense about the freedom of error or the occurrence of error in some of the states of full be-
lief. The current state and all consequences of the current state are always judged free of error.
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That an inquirer should try to avoid error does not mean that an inquirer should try to find the
true and complete theory of the world. Levi (1991, pp 61-62) rejects a theory where the goal of in-
quiry is to get the complete error-free description of the world. He calls that view messianic realism.
According to Levi, an inquirer should instead be concerned with avoiding error in the next step of
inquiry. This milder version of realism is called secular realism by Levi.
Levi recognizes three constraints on how an inquirer could judge truth and falsity in potential
states of full belief:
I. A potential state of full belief K is judged error-free by an inquirer if and only if it is a consequence of the in-
quirer's current state of full belief.
II. A potential state of full belief K is judged erroneous if and only if all states having both the current state and
K as consequences are judged erroneous.
III. At least one potential state is judged error-free, and at least one potential state is judged erroneous. (Levi
1991, p 11)
I. and II. are constraints on how different states should be judged. III. prevents judgment of freedom
from error and occurrence of error to be vacuous.
The only structure of the conceptual framework discussed at this point is that it is ordered ac-
cording to strength. Levi (1991, pp 12-13) assumes that the order of the potential states of full belief
is made in such a way that it defines a consequence relation that is reflexive, antisymmetric and
transitive, that is the consequence relation R have the following properties for all potential states of
full belief K1, K2 and K3:
K1RK1 (reflexivity)
if K1RK2 and K2RK1 then K2 = K1 (antisymmetry)
if K1RK2 and K2RK3 then K1RK3 (transitivity)
A set with an order that is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive is called a partially ordered set2.
Levi (1991, p 13) imposes some further structural conditions. Given two potential states of full
belief K1 and K2 there exist a potential state of full belief K3 such that it is a common consequence
2 For more information about partially ordered sets, lattices and boolean algebras see notes 3-5, pp 165-166 in Levi's
(1991) book. A good online resource is wikipedia, where the following pages are among those of interest:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partially_ordered_set
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lattice_%28order%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infimum
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supremum
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_algebra
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of K1 and K2 and is stronger than or as strong as any other common consequence of K1 and K2. The
strongest consequence of the two possible states is called a join ( ). ∨
For any two potential states of full belief K1 and K2 there should also be a potential state of full
belief  K3 such that both K1 and K2 are consequences of  K3 and that no other state of full belief that
has both K1 and K2 as consequences are weaker than K3. This state is called the meet ( ) of the two∧
possible states.
A partially ordered set where every possible pair of members has a join and a meet is called a lat-
tice. But why should we accept that the conceptual framework is a lattice? Levi (1991, p 13) argues
that even though it puts up some formal restrictions on the conceptual framework, it would put up
unnecessary roadblocks on inquiry and lead to dogmatism if the framework was not a lattice. Con-
sider two inquirers X and Y that are in different states of full belief K1 and K2, but share a conceptu-
al framework. Sometimes it might be a good idea for the two inquirers to move to a state of full be-
lief K3  which they both believe to be true. From that point they could evaluate K1 and K2 from an
unbiased point of view. The existence of a join of K1 and K2 assures that that can be done without
any unnecessary loss of informational value.
The existence of a meet can be motivated in a similar way. Sometimes the inquirers X and Y that
are in the potential states of full belief K1 and K2 might want to move to a possible state of full be-
lief that have both K1 and K2  as a consequence. But to avoid error, they should move to a possible
state of full belief that is as weak as possible while having both K1 and K2 as a consequence. To as-
sume that no such state exists would, as in the case of the existence of a join, put up unnecessary re-
strictions on inquiry.
With his liberal approach to inquiry, Levi (1991, pp 14-15) motivates some further structure on
the conceptual framework. In a conceptual framework, there should be a possible state of full belief
1 which is the weakest state of full belief. 1 is a consequence of every other possible state of full be-
lief. A meet of any possible state of full belief K with 1 will be K, that is, 1 can be defined as  K 1∧
= K.
The same liberal approach can motivate the existence of a strongest possible state of full belief 0
that has all other possible states of full belief as consequence. Constraint II says that any state of full
belief that has an erroneous state of full belief as consequence should be judged erroneous. Con-
straint III guarantees that at least one state of full belief in the conceptual framework is considered
to be erroneous. As 0 has all possible states of full belief as consequence, even the erroneous, 0 is
always judged as erroneous (except when the inquirer's current state of full belief is  0). A join of
any possible state of full belief K with 0 will be K, that is, 0 can be deinfed as K∨0 = K.
With the argument that roadblocks in the way of inquiry should be avoided, Levi (1991, pp 14-
15) assumes that the join of any two potential states of full belief K1 and K2 includes all and only
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the consequences of K1 and K2. There could exist a lattice where no state of full belief with all the
common consequences of K1 and K2 where available. A join could still exist, but it would not be
what we intuitively think of as the join. However, to assume that a potential state of full belief with
all the common consequences exists does not rule out any other possible state of full belief. There-
fore, Levi assumes its existence to avoid putting roadblocks in the way of inquiry.
The same assumption should be done about the meet of any two potential states of full belief. We
can assume that there exist a meet for any two potential states K1 and K2 and that the meet has only
K1 and K2 and their consequences as its consequences.
Levi does the two last assumptions to ensure that the lattice is distributive and comply with the
following two assumptions3:
For every K1, K2 and K3 in the conceptual framework,
(K1∨K2)∧K3 = (K1∨K3) (∧ K2∨K3)
(K1∧K2)∨K3 = (K1∧K3) (∨ K2∧K3)
The last assumption Levi (1991, pp 15-16) does with the motivation that no roadblocks should be
putted in the way of inquiry is also important for judgments of error. We assume that there is a po-
tential state of full belief K* for every potential state of full belief K such that K∧K* = 0. If any
state with the properties of K* is a consequence of an inquirer's current state of full belief, K should
be judged erroneous, as the meet of the current state of full belief and K would be 0.
To avoid roadblocks, Levi assumes that there is a weakest state of full belief ~K having the prop-
erties of K* to every state of full belief K in the conceptual framework. The meet of this weakest
state ~K and K should be 1. The complement ~K to the potential state of full belief K that has the
properties that K ~∨ K = 1 and K ~∧ K = 0 should be unique4.
A lattice that is distributive, have a strongest state 0, a weakest state 1, and where every state has
a complement is a  boolean algebra. So by the original assumptions that an inquirer should try to
maximize informational value and avoid error, and by the liberal approach to inquiry, Levi has mo-
tivated that the conceptual framework should be ordered as a boolean algebra.
3 When the join of two states includes all and only the consequences of the two states the join is the same as an inter-
section in set theory. A meet of two states that has only the two states and all their consequences as its consequence
is the same as a union. The distributive laws in a boolean algebra can then be motivated in the same way as the dis-
tributive laws of set theory.
4 The law of distribution guarantees that there exists only one complement to any state of full belief. This can be
shown the following way. Assume that both K2 and K3 are complements to K1. Given the definition of a complement
(K1∨K2)∧K3 = (K1∨K3) (∧ K2∨K3) can be simplified to  1∧K3 = 1 (∧ K2∨K3) which, given the definition of 1, is
the same as  K3 = K2∨K3. In the same way, (K1∨K3)∧K2 = (K1∨K2) (∧ K2∨K3) can be turned into K2 = K2∨K3.
From K3 = K2∨K3 and K2 = K2∨K3 we can conclude that K2 = K3.
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A boolean algebra where there exist one or more potential states of full belief that are maximally
strong without being 0 is called an atomic  boolean algebra. The maximally strong potential states
would then be called  atoms. An inquirer would, according to Levi (1991, p 17), be committed to
judge only one of the atoms as error-free. The potential states of full beliefs that are consequences of
the error-free atom are also considered as error-free, and should be the only potential states of full
belief in the conceptual framework considered error-free.
However, a boolean algebra does not need to have any atoms. According to Levi (1991, pp 17-
18) a reasonable sophisticated framework will not have any atoms. In an atom-free system, it would
be impossible for an inquirer to judge all the error-free potential states of full belief as error-free, as
no strongest potential state of full belief weaker than 0 would exist. There do however exist subal-
gebras, subsets of the boolean algebra with the needed structure for a boolean algebra (a lattice that
is distributive, have a strongest state 0, a weakest state 1, and where every state has a complement).
Some subalgebras will have atoms. An inquirer is committed to judging exactly one of the atoms
and its consequences as error-free.
Because the inquirer is concerned to avoid error and maximize informational value, and because
roadblocks in the way of inquiry should be avoided, the conceptual framework should be ordered as
a boolean algebra. But what determines which states of full belief are parts of the conceptual frame-
work? Levi's (1991, pp 19-21) answer is that the potential states of full belief in a conceptual frame-
work are the states of full belief the inquirer is  conceptually capable of adopting at that time. So
now the notion of conceptual capacity has to be explained. Levi can think of three different possible
explanations. The conceptual capacity of an inquirer can be that specific inquirers intellectual abili-
ties. The conceptual framework would then be the set of potential states of full belief the inquirer
can understand. But the argument for ordering the conceptual framework as a boolean algebra has
not been that people’s intellectual capacity gives a framework with the structure of a boolean alge-
bra. Indeed, Levi (1991, p 19) believes that very few people would have a conceptual framework
generated by their intellectual ability characterizable by a boolean algebra of potential states of full
belief. So Levi does not find this definition suitable.
A second possibility would be to define conceptual capacity in a way that includes all intelligent
agents. The question of conceptual capacity would be heavily related to questions such as the exis-
tence of some limit for human intellect. What is conceptual accessible for one would then be con-
ceptual accessible to all. According to this view, no conceptual changes at all would be possible.
Levi (1991, p 20) proposes a third definition. The goals of an inquirer are as stated earlier to
maximize informational value and avoid error. The potential states of full belief that the inquirer is
conceptually capable of adopting are the states she considers truth valued in a sense of concern for
her.
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Levi (1991, p 19) does not see any problem for a now living scientist working with Einsteinian
physics to evaluate the ether theory if she wants to, so paradigms do not seem to put up any restric-
tions on the conceptual framework.
There is no problems for an inquirer to add state of full belief from some one else's conceptual
framework to her own according to Levi (1991, p 20) It is only a question of what the inquirer
judges as interesting. Which states of full belief the inquirer judge interesting enough to ascribe
truth-value depends on the inquirers conceptual values. Levi does not explain what a person gets her
conceptual values from.
Now the the goals of inquiry, the structure of the conceptual framework and what determines the
set of potential states of full belief have been discussed. But how is inquiry inside a conceptual
framework conducted? As in the AGM-model, all changes inside the conceptual framework can be
described as a sequence of expansion, moving from one state of full belief to a stronger state of full
belief, and contraction, moving from one state of full belief to a weaker state of full belief.
We might want to say something about what is added with an expansion or what is removed with
a contraction. In the AGM-model this is easily done because what is added or removed are sen-
tences or sets of sentences. But Levi works with states of full belief instead of sets of sentences. One
solution would be to say that after an expansion, an inquirer has come to believe a proposition she
did not believe earlier. Propositions have played an important role in many theories about belief-re-
vision. But Levi considers it unnecessary to add another notion to the system. Instead he (1991, pp
21-24) lets potential states of full belief fill the role usually ascribed to propositions.
When we use the statement “X believes that h”, we are giving a description of X's current state of
full belief. What we are saying is that X believes at least “that h”. Now we can let a potential state
of full belief represent “that h”. X's state of full belief is then at least as strong as the potential state
of full belief representing that h. Because potential states of full belief can take the traditional func-
tion of propositions, Levi sometimes calls potential states of full belief doxastic propositions. It is
possible to make a (not necessarily perfect) mapping from doxastistic proposition to sentences in
some language L. That way, we can get a linguistic representation similar to belief sets in the AGM-
model from states of full belief.
With our expansions and contractions we strive to get more information of value while avoiding
error. Levi (1991, pp 80-81) does not consider information of value to be the same as information or
true information. Neither information nor information of value need to be true. As information does
not have to be true, the potential state of full belief that carries most information is the inconsistent
state 0, because it is the strongest potential state, having all other potential states of full belief as
consequences. But the inconsistent state is always judged erroneous and is therefore avoided if pos-
sible.
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Information varies with strength according to Levi (1991, p 81). A potential state of full belief
that is a consequence of a second potential state of full belief carries less information than the sec-
ond. All potential states of full belief are not comparable in this way. Two states of full belief where
none is a consequence of the other can not be said to have different amounts of information.
But not all information is of value to the inquirer. When trying to find new information the in-
quirer has a goal. Information the inquirer is not interested in is information, but not valuable for the
inquirer. Informational value needs to be separated from information. However, according to Levi
(1991, p 82) a potential state of full belief with more information than another state should not be
considered as less valuable. It might not be worth the risk of error to expand to a potential state of
full belief with some additional relatively uninteresting information compared to some weaker state,
but if no risk of error exists, a weaker state of full belief can not be preferred over a stronger state
because it contains more informational value. The constraint that a stronger state can not carry less
informational value than a weaker state is called the weak monotonicity condition by Levi.
Some examples of what Levi (1991, p 83) includes in informational value is explanatory power,
predictive power, simplicity and conformity to some paradigm for an adequate theory. With com-
parisons of doxastic propositions in terms of explanatory power, simplicity and so on we “attempts
to extend the quasi-ordering partially or completely with respect to informational value” (Levi 1991,
p 83). So judgment of informational value can be made in cases where there is no relation of conse-
quence between the states in question. In that way, informational value helps us create an ordering
of potential states of full belief even when no order can be done in terms of information.
While an inquirer strives after more informational value, she is determined to avoid error. Ac-
cording to Levi (1991, p 90), the risk of error increases with an increase of strength. A stronger state
can never be less risky to expand to than a weaker. This puts avoidance of error in opposition with
maximization of informational value. While the best method to maximize informational value is to
expand to 0, the best method to avoid error is to avoid expansion at all. To stay in the current state
of full belief K incurs no risk of error as it is always judged error-free. Levi's (1991, p 92) solution
to this problem is to give a formula for evaluating possible expansions. The method starts with rec-
ognizing the expansions that adds new information of value to the system and therefore is of inter-
est. Then the formula weights the risk of error with the informational value. The formula gives a
value as a result, and if the value lies within some specific range, the expansion is done. Some cau-
tion has to be taken when creating such a formula. Expansion into inconsistency could never be le-
gitimate, so the formula must never motivate expanding into 0. The formula must also be balanced
so not to risky expansions are made, while expansions are allowed in some cases. After a successful
expansion, the new state of full belief becomes the inquirers standard for judgments of error and in-
formational value.
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As the current state of full belief and all its consequences are judged free from error, contraction
can be done without any risk of error.  The problem is instead to motivate why a contraction should
be done. Levi (1991, p 117) gives some situations where a contraction would be legitimate. If the
current state of full belief shows out to be inconsistent, contraction is necessary. But a contraction
can be made for other reasons too. For example, someone might propose some doxastic proposition
inconsistent with the inquirer's current state of full belief. The inquirer can then contract to a weaker
state where the proposed doxastic proposition can be compared to the former state of full belief.
Such a contraction can be motivated if there is a good chance of ending up in a potential state of full
belief with higher informational value.
In both expansion and contraction, judgment of error is done relative to the current state of full
belief. In inquiry, only judgments of truth or falsity relative to the current state are available:
What the inquirer judges true or false is relative to what the inquirer fully believes. And when an inquirer
is concerned to avoid error, he can proceed only relative to the judgments of truth available to him. (Levi,
1991, p 91)
Before Levi's model will be discussed from a Kuhnian point of view, Levi's own critique of
Kuhn will be presented. Levi wants to make his theory incompatible with incommensurability. To
do this he adds some restrictions to how changes inside a conceptual framework can be done. He
also discusses changes between conceptual frameworks.
Incommensurability is, according to Levi (1991, p 65), when there does not exist some sequence
of expansions and contractions, beginning with an initial state of full belief K1 terminating with K2.
Levi has created the commensurability thesis to secure that his system is impossible to combine
with incommensurability:
Commensurability Thesis: Given an initial state of full belief K1 and another state of full belief K2, there
is always a sequence of expansions and contractions, beginning with K1, remaining within the space of po-
tential states of full belief and terminating with K2. (Levi 1991, p 65)
As the commensurability thesis is about changes “within the space of potential states of full belief”
it only concerns changes inside a conceptual framework. But Levi wants to secure commensurabili-
ty between conceptual frameworks. He does this by demanding that a change in conceptual frame-
work is from one boolean algebra to another boolean algebra that are either a subalgebra or a super-
algebra of the first one:
And if, as I assume, every change in conceptual framework is from one boolean algebra to another that is
either a subalgebra or a superalgebra of the first, commensurability is secured over conceptual changes.
(Levi, 1991, p 65)
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As the name suggests a superalgebra is a boolean algebra that has the original boolean algebra as a
subset. We can formulate this as the super- or subalgebra thesis (SSAT):
SSAT: Every change in conceptual framework is from a boolean algebra K1 to another boolean alge-
bra K2 that is either a subalgebra or a superalgebra of K1.
The SSAT will be discussed more in the following sections.
6. Problems with the definition of conceptual frameworks and changes between
them
Levi has defined his conceptual frameworks to be impossible to combine with Kuhn's theory about
incommensurable  paradigms.  When introducing conceptual  frameworks Levi notes  that  theories
about ether can be part of the same conceptual framework as Einsteinian physics, and with the
SSAT he tries to secure commensurability between conceptual frameworks. In this section it will be
discussed if Levi's definition of conceptual frameworks and if his SSAT are suitable in a model for
scientific activity
According to Levi the conceptual framework is determined by the conceptual capacity. The states
of full belief an inquirer is conceptual capable of adopting are the states she considers truth-valued
in a sense of concern to her (Levi 1991, p 20). What concerns the inquirer is a question of values.
As noted in the previous section, Levi does not say much about conceptual values. From this char-
acterization of conceptual capacity, Levi draws the conclusion that “the characterization of an in-
quirer's conceptual framework is as much a characterization of the inquirer's cognitive value com-
mitments as it is of his conceptual capacities” (Levi 1991, p 21). But something even stronger fol-
lows from Levi's reasoning. The characterization of an inquirer's conceptual framework is a charac-
terization of the inquirer's conceptual values and nothing else. This can be shown by going through
Levi's argument more careful.
The question is what determines which states of full belief are parts of the conceptual framework.
As noted earlier, the conceptual framework is not determined by a paradigm. It was also noted that
states of full belief from other inquirers can be added to an inquirers conceptual framework without
problem. The only thing determining the conceptual framework seems to be the conceptual capacity.
Levi writes:
The set of potential states of full belief constituting the conceptual framework for an agent X at t time con-
sists of those states that agent X at t is conceptually capable of adopting at that time. (Levi, 1991, p 19)
The next question is what conceptual capacity is. We should know Levi's answer by now. The states
of full belief an inquirer is conceptual capable of adopting is the states she considers as true or false
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in a way that is of interest for her. Levi's definition of conceptual capacity only involves a judgment
of states of interest and is thus dependent only on conceptual values. The notion conceptual value is
then left unexplained.
Thus there does not seem to be any thing else than the inquirer's conceptual values that deter-
mines the inquirer's conceptual framework. Paradigms and intelligence can only play a role if they
influence the conceptual values.
There are  some problems with  conceptual  values  as  the  only determinant  of  the  conceptual
framework. Big conceptual changes in the history of science, are they really characterizable as only
changes in conceptual values and nothing else? Are they changes in conceptual framework at all ac-
cording to Levi? If what Kuhn calls scientific revolutions are not changes of conceptual framework,
then what is?
So there are problems with letting conceptual frameworks be determined only by conceptual val-
ues. However, the way conceptual frameworks are determined is not the only part of Levi's theory
that is impossible to combine with Kuhn's theory of scientific changes. The commensurability thesis
and the SSAT are designed to secure commensurability in a conceptual framework and between
changes of conceptual framework.
According to the SSAT, a change in conceptual framework will be to a sub- or a superalgebra of the
earlier. Scientific revolutions would then have to be a conceptual change to a superalgebra, because
the potential states of full belief representing the new paradigm has to be added to the conceptual
framework. As the new conceptual framework has to be a superalgebra, all the potential states of
full  belief from the earlier paradigm will still  be in the conceptual framework. All the potential
states of full belief can then be compared in terms of freedom from error and informational value.
Commensurability is secured. But is there any historical support for the SSAT?
Kuhn (1970, pp 98-102) has given strong arguments against the view that earlier paradigms are
part of the new paradigms. Even if Newtonian dynamics can be seen as a special case of relativistic
dynamics given the right restrictions, terms like space, time and mass still represents Einsteinian
space,  time and mass  even if  it  is  the Newtonian formulas  that  are  used inside the  relativistic
paradigm.
But Levi's conceptual framework can include many different paradigms, as long as the inquirer
considers states of full belief from different paradigms as candidates for truth or falsity. So maybe
SSAT says that a scientist after a scientific revolution will consider all the states of full belief from
both the old and the new paradigms as candidates for truth and falsity. This interpretation does not
require that a new paradigm includes the older paradigm. So consider our inquirer A, whose concep-
tual framework includes only Newtonian physics. Suppose that he lives in the early 2000th century,
and  experiences  a  scientific  revolution  where  Newtonian  physics  is  replaced  with  Einsteinian
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physics. After the scientific revolution, A's conceptual framework should include both Newtonian
and Einsteinian physics according to the SSAT. But why would an inquirer who has accepted a rela-
tivistic conception of space and time consider sentences about the Newtonian absolute space as can-
didates for truth or falsity? He surely would understand sentences about absolute space. But that is
not the same as judging the sentences as candidates for truth or falsity. As the conceptual framework
is determined by the conceptual values, the SSAT says something about the inquirers values, not
what she understands.
Two problems with Levi's theory have been presented here. The first is that his notion of concep-
tual framework only seems to be restricted by conceptual values, without any further explanation of
conceptual values. The second problem is that the sub- or superalgebra thesis creates constraints on
changes in the conceptual frameworks that lack historical support. However, some parts of Levi's
theory are interesting for a discussion of a formal representation of Kuhnian paradigms and changes
between them. That is the topic for the next section.
7. Modeling paradigms and paradigm shifts
Two epistemic theories have been criticized from the point of view of a Kuhnian theory about scien-
tific changes. However, some parts of these theories and the critique against them can be used in an
epistemic theory where Kuhnian paradigms and paradigm-shifts are modeled.
In the discussion about the AGM-model it was concluded that changes in epistemic entrench-
ment was not enough to represent paradigm-shifts. In Levi's model conceptual frameworks plays a
central role. Can changes between conceptual frameworks be used as a model for paradigm-shifts?
A Levian conceptual framework is a set of states of full belief determined by the conceptual val-
ues of the inquirer. For Kuhn the taxonomic lexicon has a similar role to Levi's conceptual values:
What I have been calling a lexical taxonomy might, that is, better be called a conceptual scheme, where
the “very notion” of a conceptual scheme is not that of a set of beliefs bur of a particular operating mode
of a mental module prerequisite to having beliefs, a mode that at once supplies and bounds the set of be-
liefs it is possible to conceive. (Kuhn, 1990, p 4)
A paradigm can thus be seen as a set of beliefs determined by the lexical taxonomy, and work in-
side a paradigm can be modeled as moves between states of belief inside the set of beliefs generated
by the lexical taxonomy. This set will be called a Kuhnian conceptual framework or just conceptual
framework if the context is enough to tell if it is a Kuhnian or a Levian dito. Work inside a Kuhnian
conceptual framework is the same thing as normal science.
Beliefs in a Kuhnian conceptual framework can just as in a Levian framework be judged as true
or false. As Levi (1991, p 159) points out Kuhn seems to accept the role of informational value in
inquiry, especially when it comes to scientific revolutions. So the two goals of inquiry Levi uses to
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motivate that the conceptual framework should be structured as a boolean algebra is important for
inquiry inside a Kuhnian conceptual framework too. If Levi's argument from the avoidance of error,
maximization of informational value and his liberal approach to inquiry to the structure of a boolean
algebra is successful it might be possible to use as the structure for Kuhnian conceptual frameworks
too.
There are however important differences between the two philosophers' account of judgments of
truth and falsity. According to Kuhn a taxonomic lexicon has to be in place before any judgment of
truth or falsity can be done. Taxonomic lexicons themselves are not possible to judge as true or
false, but the possible candidates for truth and falsity are determined by the taxonomic lexicon.
In Levi's system, truth and falsity is not relative to any taxonomic lexicon. Different paradigms
can be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity.
As a conceptual scheme is a precondition for evaluations of truth or falsity for Kuhn, the concep-
tual scheme itself can not be a candidate for truth or falsity. However, the criteria Kuhn (1977, pp
321-322) gives for choices between paradigms, accuracy, consistency, broad scope and simplicity
are included in valuation of what Levi (1991, p 145) calls informational value. So maximization of
informational  value  is  important  when  choosing  between  paradigms.  The  different  conceptual
frameworks can not be considered to have different strength, so the weak monotonicity thesis is not
of interest.
Earlier in this text, it has been argued that the super- or subalgebra thesis lacks support in the his-
tory of science.  But  while  shifts  between Levian conceptual  frameworks can correspond to the
SSAT, shifts between Kuhnian conceptual frameworks can not. For Levian conceptual changes, the
SSAT could be correct in two different cases:
1. If older paradigms are part of newer paradigms as special cases. Kuhn (1970, pp 98-102) has
strong arguments against this view. 
2. If scientists after a shift to a new conceptual framework always considers states of full belief in
the older conceptual framework as candidates for truth or falsity. It was argued against that posi-
tion.
For Levi the second possibility is a possibility because the conceptual framework is determined by
the conceptual values of an inquirer and nothing else. The situation is different with Kuhnian con-
ceptual frameworks, which are defined as the set of beliefs possible to conceive given a specific
conceptual  scheme.  For  example,  when  in  a  conceptual  framework  generated  by a  conceptual
scheme that includes the notions of relativity of time, doxastic propositions about absolute time will
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not be considered as true or false. To consider states of full belief from an older conceptual frame-
work as true or false, the inquirer must be committed to the conceptual scheme generating the states
of belief. A shift between conceptual frameworks is necessary. A model of changes between Kuhni-
an conceptual changes can therefore not adhere to the SSAT.
8. Conclusion
The only structure available for representations of paradigm shifts in the AGM-model is epistemic
entrenchment, but what Friedman calls the “constitutive function” of paradigms can not be repre-
sented by epistemic entrenchment alone. A richer model is needed.
Levi's model includes the notion of conceptual frameworks. The AGM-model lacks something
similar. However, Levi's model is partly created in opposition to Kuhn's theory. Two parts of Levi's
model that makes it incompatible with Kuhn's theory was discussed - that conceptual frameworks
can include states of full belief from different paradigms, and the super- or subalgebra thesis. Both
these were shown to be problematic. In the case of Levi's definition of conceptual frameworks any
source other than the conceptual values of the inquirer was excluded as determiners of the set of po-
tential states of full belief. It was asked if big scientific changes really are characterized as changes
in value and nothing more. Or are scientific revolutions conceptual changes at all according to Lev-
i's model? If not, then what are?
The super- or subalgebra thesis was shown to lack historical support. There is no reason for an
inquirer to keep all states of full belief from the earlier conceptual framework as candidates for truth
or falsity.
From the critique against the AGM-model and Levi's model some conclusions about a represen-
tation of Kuhn's theory were drawn. The first is that something more than epistemic entrenchment is
needed to analyze paradigms and paradigm-shifts. Kuhn's taxonomic lexicons generate a set of be-
liefs. Levi's model includes a set of states of full belief.
There are more similarities between Levi's theory and Kuhns. In both, the inquirer strives for
maximizing informational value while avoiding errors. Levi uses these both goals to motivate that
the set of states of full belief should be ordered as a boolean algebra. It might be possible to use the
same structure for a model of Kuhn's theory.
Some other characteristics  about  a  model  of Kuhn's  theory were presented.  As a conceptual
scheme is a prerequisite for judgments of truth or falsity, conceptual schemes can not be judged as
true or false. Changes in conceptual frameworks are therefore only guided by informational value.
Because  a  conceptual  framework only can  contain  states  of  full  belief  from one  conceptual
scheme, the SSAT is not applicable on changes of conceptual framework.
In this text some characteristics of an epistemic theory corresponding to Kuhn's theory of scien-
tific changes have been given. Much work remains before such a theory is really given, and not ev-
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ery part of Kuhn's theory will be possible to fully formalize. Yet many parts can be formally charac-
terized.
The focus of this work has been paradigm-shifts. Nothing here has indicated that paradigm-shifts
can not be formally represented in a theory about rational belief changes. In fact some characteris-
tics of paradigm-shifts have been given that indicates the contrary.
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